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1. Introduction 
For many decades, economists have discussed the role of agricultural productivity and 
natural resources in economic development. By the late 20
th
 century, various studies showed the 
poor growth experience of resource-rich countries in the post- world war-II period. Doppellhofer 
(2000) concluded that none of the countries with extremely abundant natural resources in 1970 
grew rapidly for the next 20 years, with the exception of Malaysia, Mauritius and Iceland. Other 
studies that yielded similar conclusions include Auty (1990), Gelb (1988), Sachs and Warner 
(1995, 1999), and Gylfason et al. (1999).  This phenomenon of lower economic growth among 
resource abundant countries is known as a resource curse.   
 
While the resource curse is generally accepted, attempts to determine its roots have so far 
produced four general hypotheses. The one that stands out is the resource curse hypothesis. 
According to this hypothesis, there exists a poor potential for resource-based development in 
inducing the economy-wide innovation necessary to sustain growth in a small open economy 
(Auty 1993, 1994, 1997 and 2001; Gelb 1986b and 1988; Gylfason 2001; Gylfason et al, 1999; 
Matsuyama 1992; Rodriguez and Sachs 1999; Ross 1999; Sachs and Warner 1995 and 2001; 
Stevens 2003). Matsuyama (1992) came to the conclusion that trade liberalization in a land-
intensive economy could actually slow economic growth by inducing the economy to shift 
resources away from manufacturing (which produces learning-induced growth) towards 
agriculture (which does not). The adverse effects of agricultural production arise because the 
agricultural sector directly employs the factors of production that otherwise would be in 
manufacturing. 
 
The resource curse hypothesis has also been attributed to ―Dutch disease‖ effects. Dutch 
disease models demonstrate that the existence of large natural resource sectors, or booms in these 
natural resource sectors, will affect the distribution of employment throughout the economy, as 
wealth effects pull resources in and out of non-traded sectors. These sectorial shifts can affect 
long term growth (Matsuyama, 1992).  
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The second explanation suggests the open access exploitation hypothesis, i.e. poorly 
defined resource rights may actually reduce welfare in that economy (Brander and Taylor 1997 
and 1998; Chichilnisky 1994; Hotte et al. 2000; Southey 1978). According to this hypothesis, 
trade liberalization may exacerbate the problems related to open access exploitation. Trade 
liberalization has given rise to the concern over the sustainability of major renewable resource 
stocks. For example, there have been widely publicized claims that forests in countries such as 
Brazil, Canada, and Indonesia are being harvested excessively (Brander and Taylor 1997). 
Moreover, the temporary gains experienced by the exporting country from selling a resource 
good on world markets are not re-invested in an alternative asset. These studies have pointed to 
the role of natural resources in fostering corruption and rent-seeking behavior. 
 
The third explanation proposes a factor endowment hypothesis. This hypothesis focuses 
on ―dualism within dualism‖ in an economy (Natural Resources and Economic Development, 
Barbier; 2005). The first ―dualism‖ concerns aggregate resource use and dependency within the 
global economy. Most low and middle-income economies are highly dependent on the 
exploitation of natural resources. For many of these economies, primary product exports account 
for the vast majority of their export earnings, and one or two primary commodities make up the 
bulk of exports. Moreover, recent evidence suggests that increasing economic dependence on 
natural resources is negatively correlated with economic performance. The implications for low 
income countries is that the ―take off‖ into sustained and structurally balanced economic growth 
and development is still some time away, and thus the dependence of their overall economies on 
natural resources will persist over the medium and long term. The second ―dualism‖ concerns 
aggregate resource use and dependency within a developing economy. A substantial proportion 
of the population in low and middle-income countries is concentrated in marginal areas and on 
ecologically fragile land, such as converted forest frontier areas, poor quality uplands, converted 
wetlands and so forth. Households on these lands not only face problems of land degradation and 
low productivity but also tend to be some of the poorest in the world (Easterly and Levine, 
2003).  
 
  
  
5 
 
Finally, the fourth explanation is the social conflict hypothesis. This theory studies the 
relationship between natural resources and civil war. It suggests that natural resources (like oil) 
increase the likelihood of conflict, particularly a separatist conflict while 'lootable' commodities 
(like gemstones and drugs) do not make conflict more likely to begin, but they tend to lengthen 
existing conflicts (Ross, 2004).  According to this hypothesis, it is the civil wars that depress 
economic growth which places natural resources in a more indirect role. Snyder (2003) argues 
that the key variable is the ruler's ability to control the extraction process: lootable resources only 
breed disorder, he suggests, when a ruler lacks this control. Other studies have implied that local 
politics around the mine site - including relations between the extraction firm and local 
communities - determines whether or not a country's mineral wealth will lead to violence 
(Switzer, 2001; Swanson, 2002). 
 
Nepal, a small mountainous country in the central Himalayas, exhibits many of the 
characteristics associated with the resource curse. The country is economically poor with a per 
capita income of around US$400. The income share held by the highest 20% of the population is 
above 54% while the poorest 20% share around 6% of the income (World Bank Report, 2005). 
Much of the income is concentrated in the hands of a limited percentage of people, and 
inequality of income is high. In fact Nepal ranks among one of the worst in Human Development 
Index, a comparative measure of life expectancy, literacy, education and standards of living for 
countries worldwide. The index for some of the countries around Nepal is given in Table 1. 
Moreover, 30-50% of the population lives on fragile lands (World Bank, World Development 
Report, 2003). This inequality in the distribution of income and high concentration of the 
population on fragile land has led to dualism within dualism within the Nepalese economy. In 
addition, the country has been in a state of civil war from 1996- 2007. The forest sector 
contributes greatly to the national economy and in 2001 alone; revenue from forest products was 
about US $ 6.31 million, which is 8.6% of Nepal‘s total revenue (Central Bureau of Statistics, 
2002). The rate of forest area decrease was 1.7% per annum during 1978/79 to 1994. Since the 
beginning of the civil war, the annual rate of forest area depletion has been around 4.7%.   
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Table 1: GINI INDEX- Income and Inequality 
HDI Rank Country 1992-1997 
1
 
181 Afghanistan N/A 
146 Bangladesh 31.0 
132 Bhutan 46.8 
134 India 36.8 
95 Maldives N/A 
144 Nepal 47.3 
141 Pakistan 31.2 
102 Sri Lanka 41.1 
 
Source: ―World Development Indicators‖, Washington D.C., World Bank (2009) 
 
Sachs and Warner (1997) study the resource curse phenomenon in Nepal using primary 
product exports as a measure of resource abundance. Dasgupta (1991) establishes the resource 
curse hypothesis in case of Nepal with the help of primary product export share and share of 
population on fragile lands as proxies. These studies find evidence that supports the factor 
endowment hypothesis. However no study has been conducted so far to the author‘s knowledge 
with regard to proxies like forestry and arable land in the case of Nepal. Increase in overall GDP 
from deforestation may give rise to a greater environment-poverty trap. Hence it can be argued 
that forest depletion, along with the environment-poverty trap reasoning, gives a good measure 
of economic growth.   
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the resource curse hypothesis in context of 
Nepal based on the ―dualism within dualism‖ and social conflict hypotheses. The paper will 
focus on the relationship between the growth of the economy and the natural resources in Nepal 
by statistically testing the resource curse hypothesis using three different measures of resource 
abundance in Nepal namely, arable land, primary product exports and net forest depletion. These 
results provide additional insights to the factor endowment hypothesis as it relates to dualism 
                                                          
1
 The Gini Index lies between 0 and 100. A value of 1 represents absolute equality and 100 absolute inequality 
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within dualism. The paper will also shed in some insight to violence and deforestation and study 
the cause-and-effect relationship between deforestation and the recent insurgency in Nepal.  
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2. Literature Review 
The importance of natural resources as a driver for economic growth has undergone a 
dramatic change in the past decades. Until the 1980s, economists generally perceived an 
abundance of resources as advantageous. However, empirical and theoretical literature that 
emerged in the 1990s reached opposite conclusions. Thus, the phrase ‗natural resource curse‘ 
was coined and is associated with slower economic growth, violent civil conflict, and 
undemocratic regime types.  
 
Various studies have been undertaken with regard to proving the resource curse 
hypothesis on the global level. These include Corden (1984), Krugman (1987), Wahba (1998), 
and Torvik (2001). Torvik (2002) also shows how, in a rent-seeking economy with weak 
institutions, an unanticipated resource boom will result in more wasteful rent-seeking activity 
rather than greater entrepreneurship and investment in productive activities.  Brander and Taylor 
(1997a, 1997b, 1998) have discussed the gains from trade for countries exporting products 
derived from renewable resources. When discussing the gains from improved terms of trade 
under open access, they observe that 'the only way the foreign country could take advantage of 
terms-of-trade effects and experience steady-state gains would be if it could specialize in the 
resource good' (Brander and Taylor 1998). 
 
Sachs and Warner (1997) showed regression evidence of the curse of natural resources 
with as many as nine additional regressors. The list of additional variables include initial GDP, 
openness policy, investment rates, human capital accumulation rates, changes in the external 
terms of trade, government expenditure ratios, terms of trade volatility, and the efficiency of 
government institutions. But the study found no evidence that controlling the previous decade‘s 
growth rate altered the negative natural resource effect. This rule out the possibility that omitted 
geographical or climate variables explain the curse, or that there is a bias resulting from other 
unobserved growth deterrents. However, Sachs and Warner (2001) conclude that resource-
abundant countries tend to be high-price economies since there was a positive relationship 
between the log of the relative price level during any year of the 1970s and natural resource 
intensity in 1970, after controlling for the income effect. Moreover, a strong inverse relation 
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across countries between the log of the export contribution to growth during the period 1970 - 
1990 and the log of natural resource abundance in 1970 suggest that these countries tend to miss 
out on export led growth.  
 
In the context of resource-rich societies, social exclusion and inequality might be 
exacerbated by insufficiently compensated land expropriation, environmental degradation, 
inadequate job opportunities, and labor migration (e.g., Rosser, 2006). Resource rents also 
provide a potential source of funding for the start-up costs associated with initiating a rebel 
organization. Collier and Hoeffler (1998), based on cross-section analysis, found that resource 
dependence had a significant curvilinear effect on both the onset and duration of war. As a 
measure of resources they used the ratio of primary exports to GDP—a measure also popularized 
by Sachs and Warner (1997) in the parallel literature focusing on the relation between resources 
and economic growth. In a follow-up series of papers, Collier and Hoeffler demonstrated (i) that 
resources have an impact on some types of wars, but not on others (see also Reynal-Querol, 
2002); (ii) that resources are also significantly correlated with the onset of war in a panel-data 
setting (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004); and finally (iii) that the main results are robust to employing 
alternative measures of resource wealth (notably a measure of resource rents, see Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2005). 
 
Civil wars are commonly linked to gemstones, drugs, and timber, also known as 'lootable' 
commodities (Le Billon, 2001; Ross, 2004 and 2006).
2
 Between 1990 and 2000, civil wars 
occurred in five diamond-producing states, three opium-exporting states, three major cannabis-
exporting states, and two leading coca-exporting states (Ross, 2004). The partial influence of 
these commodities on civil war is difficult to test, owing to a shortage of reliable data. However, 
little research has been done on the role of timber.  Those case studies that were carried out 
suggest that timber exports may have influenced the duration (though not the initiation) of three 
recent civil wars: Cambodia, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Global Witness, 
2002). Because this issue has not been explored statistically, one does not know if these are 
isolated cases or part of a larger pattern. However, timber had the clearest effect in Cambodia. 
                                                          
2 However, this link has been disputed by Smith (2004). Lujala et al. (2005) demonstrate that there is no 
relation between diamonds and conflict onset. Humphreys (2005) also suggests dependence on agricultural 
production matters, implying that social relations co-shaped by economic structure are a driver of conflict. 
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Between 1989 and 1995, the rebel Khmer Rouge was able to maintain its viability as a military 
force owing to its sales of both timber and gemstones; when this revenue dropped off after 1995, 
the Khmer Rouge gradually fell apart, and by 1998 it had collapsed. The sale of timber may have 
lengthened the conflict by several years (Le Billon, 2000; Brown & Zasloff, 1998). In the other 
two civil wars, timber played at most a small role in perpetuating the conflict. 
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3. Resource Curse in Nepal 
Nepal is largely a mountainous, landlocked South Asian country. As a developing 
country, Nepal exhibits many of the characteristics associated with the resource curse. The total 
area of the country is 147181sq. km and the total population is 29 million with a 2.2% annual 
growth rate. The population density is about 190 people per sq. km., among which 30-50% of the 
population live on fragile lands. Around 80% of the people are engaged in agricultural activities, 
contributing 34% to GDP. Moreover, about 25% of the population still lives below absolute 
poverty.  
 
Nepal‘s overall long term growth has been quite discouraging. This is presented in  
Table 2:  
 
Table 2: Average Annual Growth Rates (%) of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
Population, and Per-capita GDP 
Periods GDP Population Per-capita GDP 
1965-1980 1.9 2.4 -0.5 
1980-1990 4.6 2.6 2.0 
1990-2000 4.8 2.4 2.4 
2000-2005 2.6 2.1 0.5 
2005-2009 4.0 2.2 1.8 
 
Source: Economic Surveys, Ministry of Finance and Central Bureau of Statistics, Government of 
Nepal. 
 
Nepal has so far launched eleven development plans. These were all 5-year plans with the 
exception of two 3-year plans. However there were no plans in 1961 and 1991 due to political 
changes. The above table clearly indicates that even after almost sixty years of planned 
development, there has not been any substantial change in the economic status of the people. The 
economic growth rate has not been encouraging during the entire period under study. When 
considering the population growth rate it may be considered as dismal.  
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A few studies have attempted to explain this dismal economic performance. Dasgupta 
(1993) established a relation between rural poverty and resource degradation in order to 
understand why the environment-poverty ―trap‖ is so entrenched in many poor rural areas. 
Unlike the resource curse hypothesis, the environment-poverty trap asserts that poverty is a 
major cause of environmental degradation, forming a vicious circle situation. One of the 
countries in his study was Nepal. He concluded that inequalities in wealth between rural 
households seem to have an important impact on land degradation and deforestation processes, 
which in turn appear to have an impact on the livelihoods of the rural poor.  Thus one possible 
explanation, in the case of Nepal, may the complex connections between arable land, 
deforestation and the livelihoods of the rural poor.  
 
Forests are one of Nepal‘s most important natural resources. The national forest and 
protected area system, which includes national parks, wildlife reserves, hunting reserves, 
conservation areas and buffer zone covers about 5.83 million hectares (Dept. of Forest, Research 
and Survey, 2005). This is about 29% of total land area of the country, down from 35% in the 
1980s. 20% of this is protected as national parks. In addition to their important environmental 
role, forests play a vital role in economic growth. Both direct benefits (such as timber, fodder, 
fuel wood, etc.) and indirect benefits (such as erosion control, flood control and CO2 
sequestration etc.) are derived from forest resources at a local as well as a national level.  
 
Duraiappah (1996) mentions logging and fuel-wood collection as main sources of 
deforestation worldwide and the United Nation's Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
estimates show that 1.5 billion of the 2 billion people worldwide who rely on fuel-wood for 
cooking and heating are overcutting forests. Increased fuel-wood demand, burning and grazing, 
and weak forest protection institutions contribute to deforestation (Repetto & Gillis, 1988; 
Brown and Pearce, 1994). The World Resources Institute (WRI, 1994) cited increasing human 
and livestock populations, poverty, the demand for fuel wood and high levels of consumption by 
industrialized nations to be important causes of deforestation. Panayoutou (1994) identified 
excessive timber logging as the main cause of deforestation in Indonesia and Malaysia whereas 
in Nepal he found it to be due to excessive fuel-wood consumption, overgrazing and fodder 
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harvesting. The pie chart given below in Figure 1 indicates that 80 percent of the energy demand 
in Nepal is fulfilled by fuel-wood alone.  This is consistent with worldwide trends. 
 
Figure 1: Percent of households using different sources of fuel energy in Nepal 
 
Data Source: WECS, 1996 
 
While forests are a crucial resource for the rural poor in Nepal, deforestation also creates 
arable land which is another variable that is considered as a proxy for resource abundance in this 
study. Arable land is the land capable of being used for crop growing and, thus, has qualities 
including a fresh water supply and richness in nutrients, and is located where the prevailing 
climate is suitable (wordiq.com). About 80% of the twenty nine million people of the country 
live in rural areas and practice subsistence farming, and arable land is an integral part of their 
livelihood. 
 
Explanatory data analysis has been performed to analyze the relationship between GDP 
growth, arable land and net forest depletion. The data in table 3 has been culled from various 
economic surveys, Department of Forestry and Central Bureau of Statistics, and runs from 1970 
to 2009.   
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Table 3: Average Gross Domestic Product (GDP, %), Arable Land (hectares per person), 
and Net Forest Depletion (current US$) 
 
Periods GDP Growth (%) Arable Land (hectares 
per person) 
Net Forest Depletion 
(current US$, in 
hundreds of millions) 
1970-1979 2.4 0.1621 0.5618 
1980-1989 4.1 0.1367 1.0458 
1990-1999 4.8 0.1089 1.5127 
2000-2005 2.6 0.0914 1.8537 
2006-2009 4.0 0.0825 3.6532 
 
Source: Economic Surveys, Department of Forestry and Central Bureau of Statistics, 
Government of Nepal. 
 
In Table 3, arable land has a negative relation on the growth of the country. This is 
because even when the measure for per-capita arable land is decreasing, the growth has been 
increasing. However, there might be a increase in the GDP growth as a result of increase in net 
forest depletion. The trend is explained later with the resource curse hypothesis regressions. 
 
Nepal was ruled by the Rana oligarchy for over a century. The feudalistic Rana regime 
was overthrown by the peoples‘ movement in 1951. After witnessing a multi-party system for 
about ten years, Nepal became an absolute monarchy with a partyless political system called the 
panchayat for the period from 1961 – 1990. The year 1990 saw the re-emergence of democracy 
and reinstallation of multiparty system through the peoples‘ movement. Since then, the country 
remained under the multiparty democratic system under the Royal Action of 4
th
 October, 2002. 
The emergence of the Maoists‘ insurgence began in 1996 and lasted for a decade. Then there was 
an agreement between the seven political parties opposing King‘s rule and Maoists, which led to 
the re-restoration of the Parliamentary Democratic System on April 2006, and the abolition of 
the monarchy thereafter. Presently the country is being governed by a caretaker Prime Minister 
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under the Interim Constitution. Political instability has remained a common phenomenon in the 
country since the advent of democracy in 1951. In fact the present status of economic 
development of Nepal can be attributed to the legacy of quasi-feudal political structure, political 
instability, and deteriorated law and order condition. Nepal has an ethnically and religiously 
diversified population, but ethnic and religious harmony has been the feature of the Nepalese 
society. Until the recent insurgency – led by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) – broke out 
in the mid-1990s, Nepal was known as a peaceful country. In fact, in 1970s, the late King 
Birendra even declared Nepal as a ‗‗Zone of Peace,‘‘ perhaps to reduce the risk of military 
invasion from either India or China during the cold war era. 
  
Unlike civil war in neighboring Afghanistan, the civil unrest in Nepal is not caused by 
ethnic and/or religious tension as the rebellion group (Maoists) included people from all ethnic 
and religious backgrounds. It is not either a political war motivated by lack of freedom, because 
war broke out despite improvements in political rights and civil liberties with the reinstatement 
of democracy in the early 1990s (Appendix 4). So, if it is not motivated by political suppression 
and/or ethnic and religious tension, then what has contributed to civil unrest? According to the 
Maoists, social and economic injustice against the poor has given rise to inequality in the 
Nepalese society, particularly in rural and remote areas, and this is the reason for their fight 
against the government. 
 
The resource curse in Nepal could be attributed to the Maoists insurgency that started in 
1996. Environmental deprivation (i.e. deforestation, soil erosion and degradation, flooding 
caused by over-cropping, over-extraction of mountain resources) ―coupled with demographic 
changes widened socio-economic disparities especially in the form of access to sufficient food 
and land among peoples in the Mid- and Far-western development regions of Nepal and 
indirectly led to the Maoist insurgency in these areas‖ (Bhurtel and Ali, 2003). Due to this 
insurgency in a rural setting, both the security personnel and the Maoists were trying to increase 
their power by capturing the natural resources and the income from them. The forest became a 
battleground for both the parties.  
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Most studies have measured a country's 'resource wealth' by using the ratio of its resource 
exports to its GDP. However, civil wars might cause resource dependence by forcing a country's 
manufacturing sector to flee while leaving its resource sector, which is location-specific and 
cannot easily move the major force in the economy by default. A challenge concerns the 
economic perspective on (potential) rebels as the key decision maker. Many analysts favor 
explanations based on politics and ‗state strength‘ over explanations based on economics (e.g., 
Auty, 2004; Dunning, 2005; Humphreys, 2005; Snyder and Bhavani, 2005). According to this 
view, resource-rich economies tend to suffer from weak and unaccountable leadership, which is 
unable or unwilling to diversify the economy and deliver key public goods. Alternatively, 
resource riches may invite oppressive regimes, resulting in genuine grievances among a share of 
the population. 
 
Figure 2: Deforestation and Violence Trend in Nepal 
 
 
Source: World Bank and Worldwide Governance Indicators (Sept. 2010) 
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Figure 2 talks about the relation between violence and forest depletion in Nepal. The 
violence data is extracted from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (2010), while the forest 
depletion data is from the World Bank website. The violence variable captures perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent 
means, including politically‐motivated violence and terrorism. It ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 with 
higher the number greater the violence in the country.  
 
According to figure 2, the net forest depletion and violence has a slightly positive 
relationship. During the initial years leading up to the insurgency, as the amount of deforestation 
increased, the violence in Nepal rose. However, while the amount of deforestation only increased 
slightly from 1998 to 2005, the violence in the country accelerated. During this time, the 
worsening of the situation could be attributed to various factors other than deforestation. 
However, earlier studies that were carried out suggest that timber exports may have influenced 
the duration (though not the initiation) of three recent civil wars: Cambodia, Liberia, and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (Global Witness, 2002; Ross 2004). While violence has slowly 
been decreasing after the end of the insurgency in 2006, the amount of deforestation in Nepal has 
increased astronomically. This could be due to the fact that it was the rebels who came to power 
after the war and its activists were still involved in illegal timber exports. 
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4. Resource Curse Hypothesis- Regression 
Regression analysis is used to analyze the impact of changes in natural resources on the 
GDP growth in Nepal.   The time series data for the study covers 1970 to 2009 and was taken 
from the World Bank; and Ministry of Finance, Central Bureau of Statistics. This section talks 
about the model and methodology on resource curse followed by its empirical results. 
 
Following previous studies, GDP growth is regressed against resource abundance proxies 
and other explanatory variables. Like most of the previous studies including Dasgupta (1993), 
Barbier (1999), and Sachs and Warner (1997), this study will focus on primary product export as 
a proxy for resource abundance data. However in addition to the primary product export, other 
resource abundance proxies like arable land and net forest depletion will also be studied. Given 
the importance of agriculture, rural-living and forests in Nepal, it is expected that these proxies 
will be able to provide a complete picture to Nepal‘s resource curse situation. Also, usually 
mineral export is considered to be the proxy for resource abundance. However, Nepal does not 
have any mineral exports. A wide range of variables have been either included or considered as a 
part of this study. Variables such as rural to urban population ratio, forest area, degree of 
openness, gross domestic investment and external terms of trade did not contain adequate data.  
Two dummy variables ―Pre Democracy‖ and ―During War‖ have also been included to 
incorporate the effect of political changes in Nepal.   
  
The null hypothesis is that resource abundant proxies- arable land, primary product 
exports  and net forest depletion- doesn’t affect the growth in Nepal adversely. This will make 
the alternative hypothesis:  An increase in arable land, primary product exports and net forest 
depletion will depress the growth of Nepal and vice-versa, implying the resource curse.  
 
A simple model has been used to formulate our empirical study. Annual economic 
growth depends on the resource abundant proxies- arable land, primary product exports and 
forest depletion, along with net exports, gross capital formation and two dummy variables. 
Arable land is the land that can be or is cultivated. The higher the share of arable land, the higher 
is the dependence on resource sector. Primary product exports are the share of exports of primary 
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products or natural resource exports in current US dollar term. Similarly, net forest depletion 
measures the current amount of deforestation in current US dollar term. Net export is the 
difference between the imports and exports in a given year. Gross capital formation consists of 
outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of 
inventories. The two dummies are ―Pre Democracy‖, which is the period from 1970 - 1990; and 
―During War‖, which is the period from 2001 – 2005. In the case of ―Pre Democracy‖, all the 
years from 1970 to 1990 have been marked as one (1), and the remaining years as zero (0), while 
in the case of ―During War‖ the period from 2001 to 2005 is marked as one (1) and the rest of 
the years as zero (0). The reason we included the dummy variables is to capture the 
discontinuous nature of the war data in Nepal and give us a clearer view of Nepal‘s political 
situation.   
 
Thus our regression equation is as follows: 
 
ln(GDPt) = β0 + β1 ln(Arable Land t) + β2 ln(Primary Exports t) + β3 ln(Net Forest Depletion t) + 
β4 ln(Net Exports t) + β5 ln(Gross Capital Formation t) + β6  Pre Democracy t + β7 
During War t + ξt.          (1) 
where ξt is the residual or the error term at time t.  
 
From Table 3 there exists the possibility of resource curse in Nepal for the two resource 
abundant proxies- arable land and net forest depletion. Therefore one can assume β1 (coefficient 
of arable land) and β3 (coefficient of net forest depletion) to carry a negative sign. Moreover, 
studies done by Sachs and Warner (1997) concluded that resource abundant tended to render the 
export sectors uncompetitive and as a consequence resource-abundant countries never 
successfully pursued export-led growth. Hence, primary product export too is assumed to carry a 
negative sign.  
 
Since arable land, primary product export and net forest depletion are all resource abundant 
variables, there is a possibility of high correlation between the two independent regressors. 
Robust checks for multicollinearity will be run because if the regression models are exactly 
linearly related, then the models cannot be estimated. Moreover in such a scenario, the 
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covariance between the regression coefficients of the two variables will be very high, thus 
making it difficult to interpret individual coefficients. Another problem is heteroskedasticity. 
Heteroskedasticity simply means unequal scatter. In this case, the OLS estimators are no longer 
BLUE and will be inefficient. As a result, forecasts will also be inefficient. The correlation 
matrix was analyzed to eliminate non-significant variables that may have contributed to 
multicollinearity. To perform the test using heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation robust standard 
errors, we supply our own covariance matrix using the ‗vcov‘ parameter (coeftest: GDPlm, 
vcovHC). This corrects for multicollinearity by adjusting the heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation in the matrix (see, Appendix 1).  The heteroskedasticity tests adjusted the t-
values, and hence helped predict the outcome of p-values more accurately. Finally, various 
transformations have been considered while formulating the above equation. The linear relation, 
log transformation, square transformation, square root transformation, and various combinations 
were all considered. 
  
Empirical Findings and Results 
The following observations were made about the model after running the tests. The value 
of R-square is 0.9864, and adjusted R-square is 0.9848.While R
2
 gives the information about 
the goodness of fit of a model, adjusted R
2
 is a modification of R
2
 that adjusts for the number 
of explanatory terms in the model. A R
2
 of 0.7354 shows that the model explains a high portion 
of the variability in the observed data. The residual standard error is 0.7138 on 33 degrees of 
freedom. The residual standard error (or residual sum of squares) is the difference between 
the regression sum of squares and the total sum of squares.  Since the total sum of squares is the 
total amount of variability in the response and the residual sum of squares that still cannot be 
accounted for after the regression model is fitted, the regression sum of squares is the amount of 
variability in the response that is accounted for by the regression model. Moreover, the p-value is 
almost zero (less than 1.3
-10
), which indicates the model fits the data well.  Results from the 
regression analysis of equation 1 are shown in table 4. Scatter plots and box plots for all the 
variables are shown in the Appendix (2 and 3). 
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Table 4: Regression results for presence of resource curse in Nepal  
(adjusted for Heteroskedasticity) 
                         Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept)           -0.0631791   6.1672852  -0.0102    0.008258** 
log(Arable.Land)       -0.0044315   3.6049886   -0.0012    0.00373 ** 
log(Primary.Exports)  -0.0397340   0.2894288  -0.1373    3.634e-07*** 
log(Forest.Depletion)  0.0101762   0.0353187   0.2881    0.03624* 
log(Net.Exports.Neg) -0.0218605   0.0959848  -0.2277    0.3814  
log(GCF)                    0.0903599   0.1017999   0.8876    1.078e-05*** 
Pre.Democracy         -0.2508420   0.5911638  -0.4243    0.65423 
During.War            -0.6532535   0.7661691  -0.8526    0.00471** 
--- 
 
Signif. codes:  0 ‗***‘ 0.001 ‗**‘ 0.01 ‗*‘ 0.05 ‗.‘ 0.1 ‗ ‘ 1 
 
Residual standard error: 0.08915 on 33 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared: 0.7354,     Adjusted R-squared: 0.7138  
F-statistic: 10.27 on 4 and 33 DF, p-value: < 1.3e-10 
 
From table 4 we see that for every 1% increase in arable land, GDP decreases by 0.44%. 
Similarly, an increase by 1% in primary product exports decreases the GDP by 3.97%. On the 
other hand, for every 1% increase in net forest depletion, GDP increases by almost 1.02%. This 
could be attributed to the fact that the cleared area is being used for industrial purposes. All of 
these variables are highly significant i.e., there is a less than 1% chance of rejecting the null 
hypothesis when it is true (Type I error). Also an increase in the gross capital formation by 1% 
increases the GDP by 9.04%, which is consistent with all macro-economic growth models. While 
―Pre Democracy‖ dummy is not significant, the war dummy is significant. It indicates that GDP 
growth has slowed since the re-emergence of democratic rule in 1990. This is in accordance with 
our initial hypothesis that war adversely impacts the economic growth (as said in Table 2 
analysis).  
 
The relation between the resource abundant proxies- arable land and primary product 
exports- are negative with GDP, while the relation between net forest depletion and GDP is 
positive. The negative relation is as per our assumption in the null hypothesis indicating the 
presence of a resource curse in regards to arable land and primary product exports. However, 
there is no evidence of a resource curse in regards to Nepal‘s forest.  Various reasons could 
explain the positive relation between net forest depletion and GDP growth.  
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One possible explanation is the presence of spillover effects.  David and Wright (1997) 
and Wright and Czelusta (2002) argued that it is possible for frontier expansion in a small open 
economy to lead to sustained long-run growth. They concluded that the key to this outcome 
appears to be the three conditions for ―successful‖ resource-based development. These three 
conditions are first, exogenous technological change in resource use; second, complete 
integration between the frontier and mainstay sectors; and finally, economy-wide knowledge 
spillovers. According to Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986), if the resource output from the frontier 
serves as an input into the mainstay production sector, then this ensures that frontier resource 
exploitation will contribute to some capital investment by entrepreneurs in the production sector. 
Moreover, the presence of knowledge spillovers means that capital accumulation in resource 
sector contributes to the overall innovation in the economy, leading to endogenous growth.  
 
In the case of net forest depletion the increase in GDP could be attributed to the growth in 
the timber export sector (staples thesis). The "staples thesis" argued that the successful 
development of many countries and regions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
was led by the expansion of export sectors, and in particular, natural resource exports (Chambers 
and Gordon 1966; Southey 1978). However, the "unequal development" theorists were less 
confident about the ability of poorer economies to develop and grow by exploiting their natural 
resource endowments through promoting primary product exports. It could also be due to the 
efficiency of the labor and machinery in the forestry sector that could be due to the role of 
country-specific knowledge.  
 
However in case of forestry in Nepal a crucial factor is the USAID-supported training 
that has helped community forestry user groups negotiate resource management dilemmas by 
establishing more equitable norms and increasing the participation of disadvantaged caste and 
ethnic groups. The program has supported the formation of 1,700 user groups that manage 
163,000 hectares. This goes on to strengthen the findings of Brander and Taylor (1997, 1998), 
Chichilnisky (19994) and Hotte et al. (2000) that poorly defined resource rights may actually 
reduce welfare in the economy and vice-versa. 
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5. Policy Recommendations 
We find a negative relationship between resource abundance (deforestation) and the level 
of violence (Figure 2). This could probably be because by funding the war through illegal 
deforestation and timber exports, the rebels became more powerful. This argument is supported 
to some extent by the rebels coming to the power. From all the results we could say that while 
violence might not have led to deforestation, deforestation might help lower violence. We are 
however, not clear whether deforestation initiated the war or it just happened to lengthen the 
duration of the war.  Other literature relating to the war does not credit deforestation as a reason 
for the start of the war and rather conclude that the war began due to political and ideological 
differences. The violent end of the war with the rebels emerging victorious helps us conclude 
that after all, deforestation played a vital role. Although it didn‘t initiate the war, it did make the 
war less violent while giving an upper hand to the rebels. 
 
The results have some policy implications. From the study, it looks like deforestation 
causes less violence. Thus, one can conclude that the relationship between these two depends on 
who wins the war.  If the rebels win, resource dependence causes a shorter war or less violence 
but when the government retains power, it is the other way around.  
 
Most of the policies and incentives to reduce deforestation aim to support forest 
conservation and sustainable management. Few examples available are:  
• Swaps (purchase of debt): In Philippines, USD 8 million during 14 years for the 
conservation of coastal forests 
• Property rights (transfer responsibility, work if people depend on forest resources): A 
revolving fund for biodiversity conservation that purchases land and resells it to people 
interested in conservation 
• Permit trading (e.g. development rights, rely on enforcement): Tradable development 
rights (TDR) in the US, for example, the New Jersey Pinelands 
 
Since net forest depletion has a positive impact on GDP growth our objective is to 
analyze the reason and try to implement it in the arable land scenario. Now there is a training 
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program sponsored by USAID that helps forest users examine issues of equity and participation 
in resource management. USAID is promoting this good forest management within these groups 
by concentrating on issues of equity, participation, accountability, and technical 
management. Moreover there have been acts passed and permits issued to regulate deforestation 
in the country. This is not the case with arable land or the primary product exports.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
For a few decades now, various studies have been conducted to understand the reasons 
for slow growth in countries rich in natural resources. This paper empirically investigates this 
relationship by taking arable land, primary product export and net forest depletion as proxies for 
resource abundance. Specifically, we tested the hypothesis that an increase in arable land, 
primary export and net forest depletion would result in a decrease in GDP growth in Nepal, 
drawing on the theory of the resource curse. 
 
The regression results, after adjusting for heteroskedasticity, show a significant 
relationship between the GDP growth with arable land primary product export and net forest 
depletion. The results reveal the resource curse theory is true in case of arable land and primary 
product export, thereby indicating the theories of Matsuyama (1992), and Sachs and Warner 
(1995, 1999) is firmly supported by the Nepalese data. We found that an increase in arable land 
as well as primary product export may retard growth. However, it is also possible for frontier 
expansion in a small open economy to lead to sustained long-run growth, as shown by our result 
for net forest depletion. In this case, there exist a positive relation between GDP growth and 
percentage increase in net forest depletion.  
 
Since the positive relation between forestry and growth could be the result of strong 
institutional conditions in regard to a country, the paper also made an attempt to investigate the 
relation of forestry with regard to its governance. But in case of Nepal, development efforts the 
past five decades have failed to touch the poor and contributed to a rise in unemployment, 
poverty, and rural–urban inequality, which significantly increased frustration and resentment 
among, disadvantaged youth in the rural and remote areas. This enabled the Maoists to mobilize 
disadvantaged youth from the rural and remote areas to fight against the political and economic 
system, leading to the eruption of civil war since the mid-1990s. However along with the 
political and socio-economic reasons, one would expect the natural resources to play a role too. 
Economic success and peace are signaled by economic diversification and low dependence on 
natural resources (even if these resources are physically abundant).  
 
26 
 
There however exist few limitations in this study. Although the study does show the 
relation between deforestation and violence, the direction of the causation between the two 
variables is not clear.  Did the recent insurgency force the country's manufacturing sector to flee 
while leaving its forestry sector, which is location-specific, the major force in the economy by 
default? Or was forestry used to fund the recent insurgency, thus increasing the duration of the 
war and Nepal‘s dismal economic performance? The failure to answer this question could be 
attributed to the fact that enough data to run for the study was not available. Analyzing all of this 
in more detail with a wider dataset is left for future work. 
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APPENDIX 1: AUTOCORRELATION RESULTS FOR RESOURCE CURSE HYPOTHESIS  
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APPENDIX 2: MATRIX SCATTER PLOT ALONG WITH HISTOGRAMS 
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APPENDIX 3: BOX PLOTS FOR RESOURCE CURSE HYPOTHESIS 
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APPENDIX 3: BOX PLOTS FOR RESOURCE CURSE HYPOTHESIS (cont.) 
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APPENDIX 4: RATING OF POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN NEPAL
i
 
 
Year   Political rights
ii
   Civil liberties
iii
  Freedom status 
 
1973    6     5     NF 
1974    6     5     NF 
1975    6     5     NF 
1976    6     5     NF 
1977    6     5     NF 
1978    6     5     NF 
1979    6     5     NF 
1980    5     4     PF 
1981    3     4     PF 
1982    3     4     PF 
1983    3     4     PF 
1984    3     4     PF 
1985    3     4     PF 
1986    3     4     PF 
1987    3     4     PF 
1988    3     4     PF 
1989    4     5     PF 
1990    4     4     PF 
1991    2     3     F 
1992    2     3     F 
1993    3     4     PF 
1994    3     4     PF 
1995    3     4     PF 
1996    3     4     PF 
1997    3     4     PF 
1998    3     4     PF 
1999    3     4     PF 
2000    3     4     PF 
2001    3     4     PF 
2002    4     4     PF 
2003    5     4     PF 
2004    5     4     PF 
 
Source: Freedom in the World Survey (2004). 
                                                          
i
 Political rights and civil liberties are measured on a one to seven scale, with one representing the 
highest degree of freedom and seven the lowest. When the combined average ratings for political 
rights and civil liberties fall between 1.0 and 2.5, then the freedom status is regarded as ‗‗free 
(F),‘‘ when they fall between 3.0 and 4.5 regarded as ‗‗partially free (PF)‘‘ and when they fall 
between 5 and 5.5 regarded as ‗‗not free (NF).‘‘ 
ii
 Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process. This includes right to 
vote and compete for public office and elect representative who have a decisive role on public 
policies. 
iii Civil liberties include the freedom to develop opinions, institutions, and personal autonomy 
without interference from the state. 
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